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Abstract. In this note, I discuss the simplicity of rival statistical explanations 
of a correlation, couched in terms of Reichenbachian Common Cause 
Systems. Simplicity is analyzed in two components, the so-called intrinsic 
and contextual simplicity. I show that if one disentangles simplicity from 
explanatory power then the size of the system provides an adequate for 
simplicity in both of its dimensions. 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea that simplicity is a virtue for a scientific theory goes back to ancient 
times. Comparing demonstrations, Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics, claimed 
that, “…one demonstration [is] …better than another if, other things being 
equal, it depends on fewer postulates or suppositions or propositions…” [1, A, 
86a33] – while in the Almagest, Ptolemy suggested that “…we consider it a good 
principle to explain the phenomena by the simplest hypotheses possible, in so 
far as there is nothing in the observations to provide a significant objection to 
such a procedure” [11, III 1]. However, the most famous account of ontological 
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parsimony is attributed to the medieval nominalist William of Ockham. He 
stipulated that a theory should posit no more ontologically independent 
entities than necessary - providing, thus, a rational justification for the choice 
of the most parsimonious theory - and he shaved away anything superfluous, 
which would not contribute substantially to an adequate description and 
explanation of matters of fact, by means of his famous razor. Later on, Newton, 
in his magnum opus, placed simplicity among his Rules for the Study of Natural 
Philosophy: “No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true 
and sufficient to explain the phenomena” [9, p.794].  
In contemporary philosophy, the problem of simplicity is usually broken down 
into three different aspects:  the first, concerns the definition and measurement 
of simplicity; the second one, has to do with its usage in different areas of 
research; and, the third aspect is about its rational justification as a theoretical 
virtue [2]. In this note, I consider only the first aspect of the problem, namely, 
the problem of measuring simplicity. However, far from providing a general 
account, I concentrate myself on those simplicity considerations that I deem 
necessary in order to measure the simplicity of a particular type of scientific 
explanations.      
Statistical explanations made their way in philosophy only in the second 
half of twentieth century. According to Salmon’s historical account of 
scientific explanation, they date back to 1962, when Rescher called for an 
explanatory argument “…which provides a rationalization of … [a] fact 
from premises which render it not necessary but merely probable” [14, p.50] 
and Hempel met this need by suggesting the first explicit model of 
statistical explanation [4]. However, particular aspects of statistical 
explanation have been investigated even earlier, when Reichenbach in 1956 
suggested his account of probabilistic causality and his statistical model of 
common cause explanations of correlations in terms of conjunctive forks 
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[12, p. 159]. Conjunctive forks consist of a partition of the unit element of the 
event space induced by a single element (and its complement), that satisfies 
certain probabilistic relations that are deemed explanatory with respect to 
a given correlation. In the 90s a generalization of conjunctive forks has been 
proposed by Hofer-Szabó and Rédei [6] so as to consider as explanatory, 
partitions that have size greater than two, the Reichenbachian Common Cause 
Systems.  
In this note, I try to compare two equally adequate statistical explanations of a 
given correlations couched in terms of partitions of the unity of the event 
algebra of a probability space in terms of a plausible criterion of simplicity. A 
basic assumption is that simplicity considerations do not influence explanatory 
power; this is what ‘equally adequate’ means. Simplicity has to do with the 
price to be paid in exchange for explanatory power. This price is measured in 
terms of the number of independent assumptions to be satisfied and the 
minimum information content required for a theory in order to be able to 
provide the requested explanation. Obviously, the smaller the price is, the 
simpler and more desirable the explanation is.   
 
2. Simplicity considerations 
To begin with, consider the problem to some degree of generality. Let  𝐻1, 𝐻2 
be two rival hypotheses and {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 a collection of facts. Assume that  𝐻1 explains 
{𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 , 𝐻2 explains {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 and that 𝐻1, 𝐻2 do not differ in any other respects 
relevant to explanatory power. Can one compare the two explanatory 
hypotheses on the basis of an intuitively plausible criterion of simplicity? 
It is quite common to consider a theory as a collection of models. An 
explanation is realized in a model of the theory only if that model, apart from 
the axioms of the theory, satisfies both the explanatory hypothesis 𝐻𝑖 and the 
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facts to be explained, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽
2. Nevertheless, not all models of the theory make 
true both the explanans and the explanandum. For reasons that will be soon 
made clear, some models may not be ‘rich’ enough to satisfy these two 
conditions, while others might make true more than one explanatory 
hypotheses 𝐻1, 𝐻2 for a given collection of facts {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 giving, thus, rise to rival 
explanations realized in a single model of the theory.  
Now, suppose that the models that satisfy both the fact to be explained and the 
explanatory fact can be singled out in terms of a certain set of independent 
assumptions stipulated to hold true. In general, these assumptions need not be 
considered something different from the ones describing the explanans and the 
explanandum. Their number may provide a natural measure for the simplicity 
of an explanation, since the simplest explanation of a fact depends on the least 
number of independent assumptions, other things being equal. Let us call this 
measure, intrinsic simplicity.  
Of course, as it is well known, there is no unambiguous way of counting 
independent assumptions, since any two assumptions can be reduced to a 
single one, just by considering their conjunction [5, p. 42]. However, if one 
decided on how to particularize and count the assumptions on the basis of 
some local convention, then the problem would be partially overcome. By ‘local 
convention’, I intend a case-by-case convention that does not presuppose the 
application of any general rule, other than that of consistency: one decides in 
the case at hand, how to particularize and count the assumptions satisfied by 
two rival explanatory hypotheses and their explanandum and does that 
consistently. Of course, this would never determine any global measure of 
simplicity; hence my claim that the problem is only partially overcome.     
                                                          
2 The requirement of satisfiability of the explanans and the explanandum by a model of the 
theory expresses one of Hempel’s explanatory adequacy requirements, namely, the one that 
stipulates that the explanans and the explanandum are true.   
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What happens if two explanations of a given set of facts have the same intrinsic 
simplicity? Do they differ in any other way relevant to simplicity? I believe that 
the answer should be in the positive. Among the models that satisfy the same 
number of independent assumptions for two rival hypotheses 𝐻1, 𝐻2 and a given 
collection of facts {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽, or, even, the same set of independent assumptions (in 
which case we refer to a single hypothesis 𝐻 explaining {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽), not all of them 
are equally informative; some might have greater information content than 
others. For instance, some models might have superfluous content with respect 
to the needs of the one or the other explanation realized within them and a 
restriction of the model might be equally adequate for explaining. This is 
because an explanation realized in the context of a model of a theory can also 
be realized in any extension of that model3. Let us call this aspect of simplicity 
contextual, since it depends on the information content of the model in which 
the explanation is realized when both the explanatory hypothesis and the 
explanans are satisfied. An intuitively plausible idea for the evaluation of 
contextual simplicity of an explanation is that the more information the 
explanation requires the less simple it is. In other words, contextual simplicity 
of an explanation of a given fact is a monotonously decreasing function of its 
information content.  
At this point, let me clarify something that might raise confusion. For many 
philosophers, simplicity of a scientific theory is a monotonously increasing 
function of its information content. There are various justifications of this point 
the most straightforward of which is that a simple theory must say the most 
about its subject matter (have the greatest information content) by assuming 
                                                          
3 Both the notions of extension and restriction of a model can be rendered precise, in a model-
theoretic context by means of the embedding of models.  Thus, one will say that a model is 
embedded into another if there is an isomorphism of the first model onto a sub-model of the 
second model. We will then call the first model a restriction of the second one and, 
respectively, the second model an extension of the first one.   
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the least possible [16, p. 119]4. This ideal, however, is not applicable to our 
problem. What would it mean for an explanatory hypothesis to say the most 
about its subject matter? As I understand it, it would mean an increased 
capacity of explaining many and disparate matters of fact. However, as I 
formulated the problem since from the beginning, we seek to compare 
explanatory hypotheses of a given set of facts, in terms of a simplicity criterion. 
In addition, I assumed that the explanatory hypotheses to be compared do not 
differ in any respect relevant to explanatory power. Thus, the line of reasoning 
from increased information content to explanation of different facts, 
increased explanatory power, and, increased simplicity does not apply here; 
information content does not contribute to the simplicity of an explanation. 
On the contrary, as I explained before, a demand for increased information 
content of the model that satisfies both the explanans and the explanandum 
leads to diminished simplicity. 
To take a step further, consider the simplicity of a hypothesis 𝐻 which explains 
a collection of facts {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽 in a model ℳ𝐻 of a scientific theory, 𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽;ℳ𝐻) 
as the product of the intrinsic simplicity of 𝐻, 𝐼𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽), with the contextual 
simplicity of 𝐻 in ℳ𝐻, 𝐶𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽;ℳ𝐻). Intrinsic simplicity may be regarded 
as inversely proportional to the number of independent assumptions employed 
in its definition and contextual simplicity as inversely proportional to the 
information content of the model that satisfy the hypothesis and the fact to be 
explained. Hence,  
𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽;ℳ𝐻) = 𝐼𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) × 𝐶𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽;ℳ𝐻) = 
1
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐻
  ×  
1
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 ℳ𝐻
  .           (1) 
                                                          
4 For Popper, “[s]imple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly 
than less simple ones because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and 
because they are better testable.” [10, p.128] 
7 
 
Notice that the simplicity measure defined in (1), depends on the model ℳ𝐻 in 
which the explanation is realized.  This measure can be useful when one wants to 
compare different formulations of the same explanatory hypothesis; as in the one 
provided by a model and a sequence of its extensions.  However, if the aim is to 
compare different hypotheses then one needs a model-independent simplicity 
measure. To tackle the problem, I contend that one should take into account the 
minimum information requirements that the model should satisfy in order to host the 
explanation. Hence,  
𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) = 𝐼𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) × 𝐶𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) = 
1
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐻
  ×   
1
𝑖𝑛𝑓{ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 ℳ𝐻|
ℳ𝐻 models of 𝑇
that satisfy 𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽
  }
 
, (2) 
where  𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) and  𝐶𝑆 (𝐻, {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽) is the simplicity and the contextual 
simplicity of 𝐻, respectively; the latter being calculated by taking the infimum 
of the information content over all models ℳ𝐻 that satisfy 𝐻 and {𝑒𝑗}𝑗∈𝐽. 
 
3. Statistical Correlations: Explanation and Simplicity 
In this section, I apply the aforementioned considerations to the special 
problem of explaining statistical correlations by partitions. To begin with, I 
employ the theory of probability spaces in the models of which the statistical 
correlations, the explananda, are to be defined, as well as the Reichenbachian 
Common Cause Systems, the explanatory hypotheses. For those who find 
physical intuitions clearer, I urge them to employ the theory of thermodynamic 
systems, since as Mackey states in Postulate [A]: “[a] thermodynamic system is 
equivalent to a measure space.” [8, p. 2]. However, I do not see how this can be 
more useful or informative, so I keep on in the realm of mathematics. The 
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models  ℜ of the theory are probability spaces, i.e. triples ℜ = (𝛺,ℱ, 𝑝) that 
satisfy the following conditions: 
a) 𝛺 is a non-empty set – the sample space; 
b) ℱ is a non-empty family of subsets of 𝑋 which is closed under 
complement and countable union – the event algebra; 
c) 𝑝 is function, 𝑝:ℱ → [0,1] ⊂ ℝ such that  𝑝(𝛺) = 1 and  𝑝 is countably 
additive; for a countable family {𝑋𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼, of pairwise disjoint members of 
ℱ   (𝑋𝑖 ∩ 𝑋𝑗 = ∅ for all  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼 ), 𝑝(⋃ 𝑋𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) = ∑  𝑝(𝑋𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼 . 
Statistical correlations as any other probabilistic concepts acquire meaning only 
if defined within a probability space. Hence, given a probability space ℜ =
(𝛺,ℱ, 𝑝) and 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ ℱ, the quantity  
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) ≐ 𝑝(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) − 𝑝(𝐴)𝑝(𝐵),  (3) 
for two events 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ ℱ describes a statistical correlation of 𝐴, 𝐵 in 𝑝 if and only 
if 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) ≠ 0. In addition, 𝐴, 𝐵 are said to be positively (negatively) 
statistically correlated if and only if,  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) > 0,  (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) < 0, 
respectively).  
Consider a positive statistical correlation as the fact to be explained,  
                            𝑒 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) > 0.                     (4) 
I am interested in statistical explanations of (4) given in terms of partitions of 
the unit of the event algebra ℱ. These partitions satisfy certain conditions and 
are called Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems [7, p. 81]. Hence, an 
explanatory hypothesis 𝐻 of the correlation 𝑒 would assert the existence of a 
Reichenbachian Common Cause System for 𝑒 in ℱ, i.e. the existence of a 
partition   
{𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 ⊆ ℱ, 
where 𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝐶𝑗 = ∅ for all  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼, and ⋃ 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛺𝑖∈𝐼 , such that  
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𝑝(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵|𝐶𝑖) = 𝑝(𝐴|𝐶𝑖)𝑝(𝐵|𝐶𝑖)  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ;        (5) 
[𝑝(𝐴|𝐶𝑖) − 𝑝(𝐴|𝐶𝑗)][𝑝(𝐵|𝐶𝑖) − 𝑝(𝐵|𝐶𝑗)] > 0,   for all  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼.       (6) 
 
To make explicit the nature of the explanatory relation between the correlation 
𝑒 and the hypothesis 𝐻 of the existence of a Reichenbachian Common Cause 
System for 𝑒 in ℱ, I refer to the following three features: (a) Screening-Off, (b) 
Derivability and (c) Explanatory Relevance.   
(a) Screening-Off: The correlation  𝑒 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) > 0  is screened-off in each 
cell 𝐶𝑖 of the partition {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 ⊆ ℱ, as indicated by (5). To understand this 
feature, think that were an explaining factor taken into account, the 
statistical correlation should disappear, since there is no other reason for the 
correlation to exist. In Reichenbach’s own words, “[w]hen we say that the 
common cause 𝐶 explains the frequent coincidence, we refer…also to the 
fact that relative to the cause 𝐶 the events 𝐴 and 𝐵 are mutually 
independent.” [12, p. 161] 
(b) Derivability: The correlation  𝑒 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) > 0 is entailed by the totality 
of the explaining factors in the partition which is a Reichenbachian 
Common Cause System for the pair 𝐴, 𝐵 [7, p. 81; Prop.7.2].  
(c) Explanatory Relevance: The partition is uniformly relevant to the pair of 
events 𝐴, 𝐵, as (6) requires. This last feature guarantees the inclusion in the 
explanans of factors that are explanatory relevant to the explanandum, in 
the statistical sense, as stipulated by Salmon in his statistical relevance 
account of scientific explanation. In addition, given a Reichenbachian 
common cause system for 𝑒 in ℱ there is no strictly finer or coarser partitions 
of the unit of ℱ that is a Reichenbachian common cause system for 𝑒 in ℱ as 
well. Thus, not only the partition contains exclusively relevant factors that 
screen-off the correlation but also all relevant factors that do the job (for a 
more detailed discussion of explanatory adequacy, see [15]).  
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As a last comment before taking up  simplicity issues, I would like to mention 
that in the special case of partitions of the unit of ℱ of size two, (𝐶, 𝐶⊥), in which 
cells the correlation 𝑒  is screened-off, condition (6) is redundant, since it is 
automatically satisfied and the partition is a Reichenbachian common cause 
system of size 2 [18, p.35; Cor.4]. Furthermore, Wrónski has shown that this is 
not true for partitions of size greater than 2; in his example of a partition of size 
3, the correlation is screened-off in each cell without it being a Reichenbachian 
common cause system [18, p.35; Example 1]. Apart from the obvious 
consequence that if an event and its complement in an event algebra screen-off 
a correlation then they are always explanatory relevant to it, this fact reduces 
the number of independent assumptions employed in the explanation.   
Consider the explanatory hypothesis 𝐻  that there is a Reichenbachian common 
cause system {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 for 𝑒 in ℱ. The number of independent assumptions that 
the hypothesis satisfies, hence, its inner simplicity, can be expressed in terms of 
the size of {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼, the cardinal number of its index set |𝐼|. For a correlation of 
size greater than 2, |𝐼| > 2, the number of independent assumptions satisfied is 
|𝐼| + 
|𝐼|(|𝐼|−1)
2
 . While, for |𝐼| = 2, which is the case of common cause 
explanations, the independent assumptions satisfied are just the screening-off 
conditions, as already explained; hence their number equals the size of the 
partition, it is 2 (= |𝐼|), the, Thus, the inner simplicity of 𝐻 is given by the 
following function: 
𝐼𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) =
{
 
 
 
 
1
|𝐼|+ 
|𝐼|(|𝐼|−1)
2
      , for |𝐼| > 2
       
   
 1
2
,                   for |𝐼| = 2
   ,           (7) 
Notice that  0 ≤ 𝐼𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) ≤
1
2
  with the countably infinite explanations of 
correlations having the least degree of inner simplicity, zero.  
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The problem of assessing the contextual simplicity of an explanatory 
hypothesis 𝐻 of a correlation fact 𝑒 that claims the existence of a 
Reichenbachian common cause system for 𝑒  in ℱ, 𝐶𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒; ℱ) , is the same as 
that of assessing the information content of the Boolean algebra ℱ that satisfies 
both 𝑒 and 𝐻. If we delimit our attention to the case of finite Boolean algebras, 
or, more precisely to the case of finite partitions of the unit of the algebra, the 
problem is easily tackled. In this case, a measure of the information content of 
the Boolean algebra can be given in terms of the number of events that are 
expressible in the context of that algebra; hence, by the cardinal number of the 
algebra, |ℱ|. Hence,  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝐻 𝑖𝑛 ℱ =  |ℱ| 
and  
𝐶𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒; ℱ) = 1 |ℱ|⁄  .                (8) 
At this point, one may object that the information content of a theory should be 
identified with the number of theorems that can be deductively inferred from 
the postulates or the axioms of the theory and not with the cardinality of the 
event algebra of the theory.  I disagree with this idea for two reasons: firstly, 
the number of theorems that are deducible from the axioms of a theory depend 
on the number of meaningful propositions that can be formulated in the context 
of that theory. However, as Reichenbach, in his first principle of the probability 
theory of meaning, suggests, “…a proposition has meaning if it is possible to 
determine a weight, i.e., a degree of probability, for the proposition.” [13, p.54]. 
Thus, the cardinality of a Boolean algebra in a probability space measure the 
meaningful propositions that can be formulated in the context of the theory and 
provides an adequate measure of its information content. Secondly, seeking 
deductive consequences of the postulates would complicate things 
unnecessarily since it would leave us open to the undesirable “circumstance 
that the information (logical) content of each theory is infinite in the sense that 
12 
 
one may deductively infer an infinite number of theorem-consequences from 
the postulates of a theory.” [16] 
To construct a model-independent measure of contextual simplicity for an 
explanation 𝐻 of a correlation 𝑒, one needs to consider the minimum, in terms 
of cardinality, Boolean algebra that satisfies both the explanans and the 
explanandum. I will construct this algebra as a Boolean subalgebra of an 
arbitrarily chosen ℱ that satisfies both 𝐻 and 𝑒. 
To begin with, consider a partition 𝐻 = {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 of the unity of the event algebra 
ℱ which satisfies (5) and (6) in a probability space ℜ.  Assume that |𝐼| < ∞ and 
ℒ𝐻 is the Boolean subalgebra of ℱ generated by 𝐻 = {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼.  ℒ𝐻 is a finite 
algebra having 2|𝐼| elements, since it is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of 
subsets of the family {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 [17, p.37; Lm 1].  
By construction, ℒ𝐻 is the minimal Boolean algebra containing the explanatory 
partition. The next step is to extend this algebra so as to contain the correlated 
pair 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ ℱ as well. The extension will be constructed in two steps; first I 
consider ℒ𝐻,{𝐴} the Boolean subalgebra of ℱ generated by the set  ℒ𝐻⋃{𝐴}. ℒ𝐻,{𝐴} 
consists of elements of the form, (𝑋 ∩ 𝐴) ∪ (𝑌 ∩ 𝐴′), where 𝑋, 𝑌 ∈ ℒ𝐻  [3, p.83; 
Lm 2]. In order to calculate the cardinality of ℒ𝐻,{𝐴}, consider the number of 2-
permutations of the 2|𝐼| elements of ℒ𝐻 , which corresponds to the number of 
elements of ℒ𝐻,{𝐴} given by the aforementioned formula for 𝑋 ≠ 𝑌, and add to 
this number, 2|𝐼|, which are is the number of the additional elements of ℒ𝐻,{𝐴},  
for 𝑋 = 𝑌. Hence,  
|ℒ𝐻,{𝐴}| = (2
|𝐼|)
2
+ 2|𝐼| =
(2|𝐼|)!
(2|𝐼|−2)!
+ 2|𝐼| = (2|𝐼| − 1)2|𝐼| + 2|𝐼| = 22|𝐼|. 
Next, I repeat the same procedure to construct ℒ𝐻,{𝐴,𝐵}, the subalgebra 
generated by the set ℒ𝐻⋃{𝐴, 𝐵}. The cardinality of this algebra, which will 
provide a measure of the contextual simplicity of  𝐻,  is the following: 
|ℒ𝐻,{𝐴,𝐵}, | = (2
2|𝐼|)
2
+ 22|𝐼| =
(22|𝐼|)!
(22|𝐼|−2)!
+ 22|𝐼| = (22|𝐼| − 1)22|𝐼| + 22|𝐼| = 24|𝐼|. 
From the above considerations, one infers that  
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𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝐻 = 24|𝐼|,  
and 
𝐶𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) = 1
24|𝐼|⁄
 .             (9) 
  
Moreover, to the contextual simplicity 𝐶𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) of an infinite partition {𝐶𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 
constituting an explanatory hypothesis for 𝑒, I suggest to assign the value zero, 
since the Boolean algebra ℒ𝐻 generated by a countably infinite partition has the 
cardinality of the continuum  [17, p.37; Lm 1]. 
Consequently, the simplicity of 𝐻 , 𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) for a finite partition is, 
𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) =
{
 
 
 
 
1
|𝐼|+ 
|𝐼|(|𝐼|−1)
2
  ∙  
1
24|𝐼|
    , for |𝐼| > 2
       
               
 1
29
       ,           for |𝐼| = 2
    ,   (10) 
while for countably infinite partitions is zero. Hence,   
0 ≤ 𝑆(𝐻, 𝑒) ≤
1
29
 .  (11) 
As a final remark, notice that to compare two explanatory hypotheses of two 
respective correlations using the aforementioned suggestions, one first needs 
to identify the two correlations by means of a Boolean isomorphism that 
preserves the probability.  
Let ℜ1 = (𝛺1, ℱ1, 𝑝1) and ℜ2 = (𝛺2, ℱ2, 𝑝2) be two probability spaces and 
 𝑒1 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝1(𝐴1, 𝐵1) > 0,  𝑒2 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝2(𝐴2, 𝐵2) > 0, where 𝐴1, 𝐵1 ∈ ℱ1 and 
𝐴2, 𝐵2 ∈ ℱ2, two correlations  defined in ℜ1 and ℜ2, respectively.  In order to 
consider  𝑒1 and 𝑒2 identical, there must be a mapping ℎ:ℱ1 → ℱ2 , which maps 
isomorphically the Boolean subalgebra of ℱ1 generated by the correlated pair 
𝐴1, 𝐵1 ∈ ℱ1,  
ℱ𝐴1𝐵1 = {
∅, 𝐴1, 𝐵1, 𝐴1
′, 𝐵1
′, 𝐴1 ∩ 𝐵1, 𝐴1 ∩ 𝐵1
′, 𝐴1
′ ∩ 𝐵1, 𝐴1
′ ∩ 𝐵1
′, 𝐴1 ∪ 𝐵1, 𝐴1 ∪ 𝐵1
′,
𝐴1
′ ∪ 𝐵1, 𝐴1
′ ∪ 𝐵1
′, ( 𝐴1 ∩ 𝐵1) ∪ (𝐴1
′ ∩ 𝐵1
′), (𝐴1 ∩ 𝐵1
′) ∪ (𝐴1
′ ∩ 𝐵1), 𝛺1
} 
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onto the Boolean subalgebra ℱ𝐴2𝐵2 of ℱ2 , generated by 𝐴2, 𝐵2 ∈ ℱ2. In addition, 
it is required that at least with respect to the elements of ℱ𝐴1𝐵1 the mapping 
preserves the measure,  
 ∀𝑋 ∈ ℱ𝐴1𝐵1 , 𝑝2(ℎ(𝑋)) = 𝑝1(𝑋). 
Suppose that the aforementioned condition is satisfied then the same correlation 
is satisfied by two probability spaces  ℜ1 and ℜ2, 
 𝑒 =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝1(𝐴1, 𝐵1) =  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑝2(𝐴2, 𝐵2)  > 0,       (8) 
Next, we assume that there are partitions of the unity of the Boolean algebras 
ℱ1 and ℱ2, 
𝐻1 = {𝐶
1
𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼1 ⊆ ℱ1 and  𝐻2 = {𝐶
2
𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼2 ⊆ ℱ2,  
which satisfy relations (5) and (6) for the pairs 𝐴1, 𝐵1 ∈ ℱ1 and 𝐴2, 𝐵2 ∈ ℱ2, 
respectively. 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 are two hypotheses which explain adequately the same 
correlation 𝑒.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Simplicity is a desideratum for scientific explanations. However, there is no 
consensus on how to measure simplicity. I suggest that one might disentangle 
simplicity from explanatory power and compare in terms of simplicity, equally 
adequate explanations of some fact. Given that, I put forth two different criteria 
of simplicity: firstly, the number of independent assumptions required by the 
explanatory hypothesis; the simpler explanation makes less assumptions - I call 
this intrinsic simplicity. Secondly, the information content of the model of the 
theory in which the explanation is realized. Again, the simpler requires a 
smaller information content. This type of simplicity is dubbed contextual. 
Contextual simplicity of an explanation depends on the model of the theory in 
the context of which the explanation is couched. However, there is a minimum 
information content requirement that defines a model-independent measure of 
contextual simplicity. These ideas apply to the case of Reichenbachian 
15 
 
Common Cause systems for a given correlation. After providing three 
conditions of explanatory adequacy, I suggest a measure of intrinsic simplicity, 
(7), that is a function of the size of the partition of the unity of the Boolean 
algebra of events. Then, I argue for the understanding of contextual simplicity 
in terms of the cardinality of the Boolean algebra of events, (8); in doing so I 
delimit the discussion to finite algebras. Lastly, I provide a model-independent 
measure of contextual simplicity, (9), as a function of the cardinality of the 
partition. Here the assumption is that the Boolean algebra with the minimum 
information content is the one generated by the partition and the correlated 
events. The bottom-line of this account is that the measure of simplicity of a 
Reichenbachian system is a decreasing function of its size. In particular, let  
|𝐼1|, |𝐼2| be respectively the cardinalities of the explanatory partitions 𝐻1, 𝐻2 for 
a given correlation 𝑒: if |𝐼1| < |𝐼2| then 𝑆(𝐻1, 𝑒) >  𝑆(𝐻2, 𝑒); if |𝐼1| = |𝐼2| then 
𝑆(𝐻1, 𝑒) =  𝑆(𝐻2, 𝑒); and if |𝐼1| > |𝐼2| then 𝑆(𝐻1, 𝑒) <  𝑆(𝐻2, 𝑒). 
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